Abstract-The paper describes a new RNS (residue number system) modular multiplication algorithm, for finite field arithmetic over FP , based on a reduced number of moduli in base extensions with only 3n/2 moduli instead of 2n for standard ones. Our algorithm reduces both the number of elementary modular multiplications (EMMs) and the number of stored precomputations for large asymmetric cryptographic applications such as elliptic curve cryptography or Diffie-Hellman (DH) cryptosystem. It leads to faster operations and smaller circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
High-performance arithmetic is required in asymmetric cryptographic applications such as RSA [1] , elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [2] , [3] and discrete logarithm (DL) [4] with Diffie-Hellman [5] and Elgamal [6] cryptosystems. In these applications, operands range from a few hundred bits (160-550 in ECC) to a few thousand bits (1024-8192 in RSA and DL). Hence, reducing the computation time and silicon area is a major concern for hardware embedded systems.
The residue number system (RNS, [7] , [8] ) may be seen as a consequence of the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) where large integers are represented by their remainders modulo small integers. There is no carry propagation between moduli, thus, some computations can be performed over all moduli in parallel or in random order [9] . An RNS base B consists of n moduli of w bits. RNS is increasingly used in asymmetric cryptographic research, see Tab. I. Typical numbers of moduli n range from a few moduli (for small ECC) to several dozens (for large RSA or DL).
Modular multiplication is the most costly frequent operation in cryptographic applications. In this paper, we propose a new RNS modular multiplication algorithm over F P with a reduced number of moduli in base extensions. Standard base extensions algorithms use 2n moduli ( [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] ). Our method only uses 3n 2 moduli, reducing data storage and number of operations for large cryptographic parameters. Sec. II presents the notations and definitions. Sec. III recalls state-of-art methods. Sec. IV details our method and some DL and ECC applications are presented in Sec. V.
II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
• |X| P is X mod P with P an -bit prime • m a,i a w-bit pseudo-Mersenne modulo, m a,i = 2 w −h a,i with h a,i < 2 w/2 and n = /w
• B a , B b , B c 3 coprime RNS bases, with B a = (m a,1 , . . . , m a,na ) composed of n a moduli all m a,i pairwise co-primes (similar definitions for B b and B c )
• − −− → (X) a represents X in the RNS base B a , abbreviated by − − → X a when no confusion is possible, and defined by:
, EMW a w-bit elementary memory word (for storage)
III. STATE-OF-ART
A. Residue Number System (RNS)
RNS has been proposed in [7] , [8] and used in asymmetric cryptography (see Tab. I). A large integer X, with 0 X < M a , is converted to a unique RNS representation − − → X a in base B a by applying definition at Eqn. (1) . The reverse conversion, from RNS to a standard representation, uses the CRT formula:
Addition/subtraction and multiplication are efficient and simple in RNS ( ∈ {+, −, ×}). For instance in base B a :
Computations modulo m a,j are independent from those performed on other moduli m a,i with i = j, whereas classical binary representation requires carry propagation. Then, an RNS multiplication requires n a independent EMMs. In base B a , exact division by Z can be performed through a multiplication by
a | ma,n a ) when Z is coprime to M a . All these RNS operations are performed modulo M a in base B a (a consequence of the CRT) and similar behavior holds for bases B b and B c .
But RNS is a non-positional representation, thus comparisons, general division and modular reduction are complex and costly operations in RNS (for instance, see [10] 
B. Base Extension
To speed up operations such as RNS modular reduction, the base extension (BE) has been introduced in [10] . It converts − − → X a from base B a into −→ X b in base B b without intermediate conversion to a classical representation. Among state-of-art BE algorithms [12] , [13] , [11] , we only consider [12] due to its high level of parallelism (but our idea can be extended to other methods). BE Algo. 1 approximates the CRT formula
.
In BE Algo. 1 from [12] , the trunc function approximates the division ξ a,i /m a,i using only a few most significant bits of ξ a,i and 2 w instead of m a,i . The approximation error is denoted ε max . If X a < (1 − σ 0 )M a with ε max < σ 0 then this approximation has no influence on the result and the output of Algo. 1 is −→ X b . In the other case, σ 0 is set to 0 and the output is either
See [12] for all details regarding the approximation. This algorithm requires (n a n b +n a ) EMMs.
Algorithm 1: Base extension (BE) from [12] Input:
Precomp.:
State-of-art RNS modular multiplication is based on the Montgomery modular multiplication [22] , its RNS adaptation was initially proposed in [23] and optimized in [24] , [12] , [18] .
Algorithm 2: RNS Montgomery Reduction from [23]
RNS modular reduction (RNS-MR) Algo. 2 mainly differs from the standard Montgomery reduction by the use of 2 BEs to be able to divide by B a . Usually, both bases have n elements (n a = n b = n). Thus, modular multiplication is computed using an RNS multiplication followed by a reduction with Algo. 2. [18] presents optimizations leading to an RNS Montgomery multiplication with 2 n a n b + 2n a + 2n b = 2 n 2 + 4 n EMM. The output of RNS-MR is the RNS representation of S < αP , with α 3, with α an adjustable parameter to perform more complex operations (e.g. AB + CD mod P ).
IV. PROPOSED RNS MODULAR MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
The objective of our method is to, in a first time, decompose the operands into 2 sub-values, and, in a second time, use them in such a way only 3n/2 moduli are required instead of 2n. This leads to reduce the number of elementary computations and/or data storages in some operation patterns. In case of a square, the splitting step is performed only once. Same thing applies in case of multiplication by a constant. For instance, in the Montgomery powering ladder (see [25] ), a loop with the pattern A ← BC, D ← B 2 is performed (the decomposition of B is reused for BC as well as for B 2 ). Our RNS modular multiplication (named SPRR) is divided into 3 steps: splitting (Split), partial reduction (PR) and final reduction (R). Let us assume |XY | P is computed (or |XY M | P as for Montgomery multiplication). Split performs a specific decomposition of X and Y into 2 sub-values (see Sec. IV-A). PR uses these decompositions to compute a partially reduced value which is finally reduced using RNS Montgomery modular reduction. The complete SPRR is detailed at Sec. IV-B.
A. The Splitting Step
In this step, operands X and Y are split into their quotient/remainder by M a using Algo. 3 such that X = K x M a + R x and Y = K y M a +R y . The first BE (line 1) converts the remainder from B a to the other bases (we recall To convert K x back to B a using Algo. 1, the constraints presented in Sec. III-B have to be respected to ensure an exact result. Using base B b at line 3 gives
The same type of constraint occurs when B c is chosen instead of B b in a symmetric way.
Algorithm 3: Proposed Splitting
Step (Split)
Input:
− −−− → X a|b|c , X < αP
The computation performed in base B b for the multiplication by is then precomputed.
Thus, the total cost of Split is (n a + n a (n b + n c )) + (n b + n b n a ) + n c EMMs. In the case n a = n b = n c = n/2, this cost is The Split step behaves as the decomposition in Karatsuba multiplication [26] (leading to 3 sub-products instead of 4 without decomposition). But Karatsuba method cannot be used in RNS since it is a non-positional representation.
B. SPRR Modular Multiplication Algorithm
Our method is presented in Algo. 4 and illustrated on Fig. 1 .
Algorithm 4: Proposed Modular Multiplication (SPRR)
Input:
After the decomposition, one has:
a | P and M a have approximately the same size, i.e. ∃µ, with µ small and such that µP + 1 = M a × D.
Under hypothesis H 1 , we defined U as
(4) If we choose n a = n/2 then the sizes of M a , R x , K x and D are very close to /2 under H 1 . One gets log 2 U ≈ 3 2 log 2 P under H 1 . More precisely, assuming C(α, µ) = α 2 µ D + 5α + 4µM a , we have:
This explains why U can be seen as a partially reduced value of |XY D| P . Then, the computation of U is called partial reduction (PR). Its cost is the evaluation of U in the 3 bases: 4 multiplications and 2 multiplications by constants M a and D in Eqn. 4 . Multiplying by M a in B a is equivalent to multiply by 0, then these 6 multiplications in all bases require 4n a + 6(n b + n c ) = 8n EMMs. This cost can be reduced to 7n EMMs using Karatsuba's method [26] on bases B b and B c (there is no impact on the first base):
For the square operation, one multiplication in B a can be saved and the cost is 6.5n EMMs. In the operation pattern (XY, XZ), the operations Split(X), K x (M a + 1) and R x (D+1) are performed only once, then its cost is 4.5n EMMs. In case of a multiplication by a constant Y , factorizations by K x and R x occur in Eqn. 4, leading to 3n EMMs.
The last step is the final modular reduction of U represented on 3 2 n moduli using Algo. 2 (where the first base is B b and the second one is B a|c due to the choice of B b in the Split see second paragraph of Sec. IV-A, this saves (n 2 /4) + (n/2) words of w-bit precomputations). Its cost is 2n b (n a + n c ) + 2(n a + n c ) + nb = n 2 + 5 2 n EMMs. It takes into account some optimizations from [17] , [18] .
We have a complete proof for Proposition 1 based on some inequalities rearrangements. But due to paper length limitation, we cannot reproduce it here (ask the authors if needed). Under hypothesis H 2 , we defined U as
The added term M a P ensures U to be non negative. The only one difference in Prop. 1 using Condition H 1 (or H 2 ) is not strictly required in Prop. 1. But it strongly impacts the size of U and then the total cost. The condition H 1 restricts the choice of parameters in some cryptosystems. Up to now, we do not have a selection method to choose a base from a chosen P to satisfy H 1 . Then, we cannot choose parameters proposed by NIST for ECC (which was especially designed to be efficient in the standard representation, e.g. P 521 = 2 521 − 1). But, one can generate P such as M a D − 1 = µP , with µ a small integer. In practice, we can select µ = 1, try random values for D (of size ≈ /2) and test the primality of M a D−1. This method works to generate DL parameters and new P for ECC, optimized for the use of RNS implementation similarly to NIST primes for the binary representation.
As in Montgomery modular multiplication, operands must be converted into
X = |XM a M b | P and Y = |Y M a M b | P , then SPRR result is |XY M a M b | P under H 1 and H 2 .
C. Parameters Selection
For the final modular reduction, one can start from any of the 3 bases. Due to the precomputations savings mentioned above, base B b is preferred to B c and choosing B b instead of B a allows a wider parameter space (starting from M a limits the number of couples (α, µ)). Starting from B b , operands are represented by |XM a M b | P (the same for Y ) which is the usual RNS Montgomery representation.
In a very detailed analysis, one can notice that the size of M b is longer than the one of M a of two bits or more (for µ = 1, α = 3 : M b > (9D + 4M a + 12) ). These few additional bits can be easily obtained (e.g. one modulo in B a with w − 1 bits and one modulo in B b with w + 1 bits). This kind of effect is neglected in the operation count (we assume multiplications of w, w − 1 and w + 1 bits operands all have the same cost).
V. APPLICATIONS
The theoretical performances of our method (SPRR) are compared to state-of-art RNS modular multiplication (RNS-MM). We analyze the required number of elementary computations and data storage for both solutions. Only the number of elementary modular multiplications (w-bit) EMMs and elementary memory words EMWs are compared. The product EMM × EMW is also used as a common global cost metric for hardware implementation. Operations are directly written in the Montgomery representation (i.e. |AB| P is in fact |ABM | P with M = M a M b ).
First, basic operations |AB| P , |A 2 | P and |cst × A| P cost 2n 2 + 4n with RNS-MM (cst is a constant number). Using SPRR, it costs 4 n 2 + 7n respectively. Using several patterns in one larger sequence of operations, due to factorizations and reuse, the total cost can be reduced compared to the sum of the individual ones. The total number of precomputed memory words is Tab. II), and 2n 2 + 10n for RNS-MM (from [18] ). For large fields, 25 % improvement is achieved due to the reduction from 2n to 3n/2 moduli in the RNS basis. Moreover, even small RNS bases such as n = 5 lead to 20% memory reduction.
A. Discrete Logarithm in RNS
Exponentiations in F P are common in cryptography such as in Diffie-Hellman [5] and Elgamal [6] cryptosystems. Both are based on the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields [27] . P is a 1024-3072 bits prime with P − 1 = V Q and Q a 160-256 bits prime. In fact this condition corresponds to H 2 , choosing µ = 1 and D as a multiple of Q: P − 1 = M a D = M a V Q = V Q. Thus P can be generated under H 2 and be used for DL. Exponentiations of G are then computed with G a generator of the subgroup of order Q of F * p . Fig. 2 presents the results for both Montgomery ladder [25] and least significant bit first (LSBF) exponentiation algorithms. For this type of application, our method speeds up the computation (EMM) and reduces the global implementation cost (EMM × EMW). For instance, for the Montgomery ladder, there is a computation cost of 3.5n 2 + 19n EMMs for SPRR against 4n 2 + 8n EMMs for RNS-MM. Moreover, the product EMM×EMW gives 5.25n 4 +58.25n 3 +161.5n 2 for SPRR against 8n 4 + 56n 3 + 80n 2 for RNS-MM. Common sizes of 1024 and 2048 bits correspond to 33 and 66 moduli (see Tab. I), and lead to 4 % and 9 % number of EMMs reduction respectively, and up to 30 % reduction of the global cost.
B. Elliptic Curve Cryptography Formulas in RNS
The second application uses SPRR on ECC. We compare SPRR and RNS-MM costs for a set of fast formulas from the explicit formulas database [28] with the usual parameters short Weierstrass form and Jacobian coordinates, for details see [2] . Formulas are given for the point doubling, tripling and mixed addition (point addition with a precomputed point with Z = 1). The detailed results are in Tab. III.
These results are graphically illustrated in Fig. 3 where mADD stands for point mixed-addition, DBL doubling and TPL tripling. The bottom sub-figure corresponds to individual curve level operations (DBL, TPL, mADD). SPRR is more interesting when operands are reused several times, this is why the gain is more important on DBL and TPL formulas than mADD. As an example, in doubling formulas a Split step is applied on Y 1 and Z 1 and then can be used to compute Y 2 (lines 2, 4 and 10 respectively in Tab. III). We selected 2 common curve level patterns: 2DBL+mADD and TPL+2DBL+mADD for scalar multiplication. The top sub-figure shows that considering the global cost (EMM × EMW), our method is more efficient for n > 5. For bases with n 16, one obtain more than 25 % global cost improvement using our method. Moreover, SPRR requires less EMMs than RNS-MM with n > 16. For instance, for the binary scalar multiplication, it leads to 4.5% and 9.5% of reduction for n = 20 and n = 34, respectively (for GPU implementations with w = 16 for instance, see [19] ). 
VI. CONCLUSION
A new RNS modular multiplication algorithm has been proposed. Thanks to a specific decomposition of the operands, some internal computations are shared and only use 3n/2 moduli instead of 2n for standard methods. Memory requirements are reduced from 20 % to 25 % for some asymmetric cryptographic applications. For ECC and DH applications, the number of operations can be reduced up to 10%. Hence, the total cost of an implementation using our algorithm is expected to be better than state-of-art solution for large field applications. Future prospects include more advanced parameters selection and full hardware implementation.
